St. Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God proved both frustrating and weak. In short, there is no room to refute the argument on its own merits. The argument is correct. The tension arises when one considers whether or not one can ever be persuaded to believe in God. However, it can be argued that the question of whether or not the premises have any truth value is only a symptom of a larger problem: faith needs an argument to have some motivational force. Norman Malcolm argues that one needs “living faith” to accept the argument. Let the atheist grant that the argument cannot be refuted by any contradiction, but he will never accept the truth of the argument without embracing faith.
Anselm’s argument can be divided into nine parts. The first statement sets the stage for the argument, saying that things can only exist in two ways: in mind and in reality. For Anselmus can also exist from these two in different combinations. An example of something that is in the mind but not in reality can be a unicorn. We have the concept of the unicorn, but the physical manifestation of this concept cannot be found in the real world. Something that exists in reality but not in the mind may be an as yet undiscovered species of animal or chemical compound. Perhaps a new species of monkey exists deep in the Amazon rains, but we do not yet know of its existence and so it cannot be in our minds. Something can also be in the mind and in reality. We have an idea for an elephant, and if you want to jump to Africa or Asia (or a more miserable enclosure), we can also test it in real life. The final composition is that there is something that is neither in mind nor in reality. A square circle is a logical contradiction, so it is not in the mind. Physical manifestation is just as contradictory, and so neither in reality.
The second proposition introduces the concept of the greatest being conceived. But the premise states that a being which cannot be thought of can exist in reality. It is impossible to be the greatest intelligible being. a third proposal is also linked to this idea GCB, asserting that such an entity is not in mind. GCB may here be interpreted as God, although that conclusion should not necessarily be reached. [4] When we have some idea of the greatest being, we can think that it exists at least in the mind (or understanding). . Here it can be doubted that humans have a limited capacity to conceive of such a being. Recalling the metaphysics of things that can exist in reality, but not in the mind, it can be said that there exists a being greater than the greatest being that we can think of. It could be said that the GCB was not the most important entity in the act; it simply lacks an epistemic approach to thinking about the extent to which a being can exist in reality. This argument may have some weight. However, he does not intend as much as he intended, considering the further premise of Anselm’s argument.
Here I add what Anselm’s argument may be considered; all subsequent ones simply follow from this one. For states are presupposed that whatever is in the mind and can be in reality is greater than it is. What Anselm states here is that being in the mind is below being in reality. being that which exists only in the mind is inferior to that which exists in reality. So if GCB is only in the mind, and could be in reality, this would be major.
When discussing the GCB the obvious question is whether we can conceive of the greater one, i.e., that which exists in reality and in the mind. And this is what Anselm wanted. which reason proceeds, a form of reduction to the absurd, in order to reach the desired conclusion of Anselm. It puts GCB only in mind. If that assumption is made, it is clear that the GCB is not the greatest act that we could conceive. This leads to an absurdity: the greatest thing is conceivable, but it is only in the mind, it means that it is not as much as it could be. 6. Since this conclusion leads to an obvious absurdity, Anselm does not hesitate to affirm that it is false that GCB exists only in the mind. GCB is both in mind and in reality. [7] Anselm therefore believes that he has provided a priori, a strong argument for the existence of God (or rather GCB) and has.
Before looking at Malcolm Wittgensteinian criticism of Anselm’s proposal, it is relevant to clarify a few philosophical questions about the structure and implications of the argument. In the first way, that some may show, and many, that it is inappropriate to ascribe a property to any one. And this seems to be through the abstraction of what we really mean when we say something is. When I say that it is my dog, I am not saying that among many other characteristics it also happens to be a property of existence. I mean it’s my dog. He sits next to me, chewing toy, etc. It seems ridiculous to assert that existence is a property; compared with other characteristics of having hair, one white spot or having brown eyes.
Additionally, Malcolm discusses what he perceives as a potential difference between the two formulations of the ontological argument provided by Anselm. In the first formulation, Malcolm posits that Anselm suggests that existence is perfection. Invoking Kant and Gassen, Malcolm asserts that the assertion of the perfection of being is fallacious because it presupposes that being is “a predicate of things.” To attribute the existence of a predicate to someone is odd. As Kant put it: “we do not add the smallest thing when we further declare this thing to be.” [9] Thus to think of being is to think of it as something added to an object. If this is so, we cannot say that whatever we conceive is in reality exactly in the way in which we conceive it, that existence would add something to it.
Malcolm thinks that this problem is removed in Anselm’s second formula, which explains that perfection is necessary for existence. Speaking of “necessary existence” modifies existence in a way that is consistent with our conceptions of God as being without cause and unlimited. To speak of the GCB as necessarily existing is to properly attribute a property, just as necessary omnipotence and necessary omniscience are properties of God. Malcolm finds this distinction important because it preserves some of the integrity of Anselm’s argument. Perhaps one of the only substantial critic-sments that can belyd against Anselm’s argument is that it predicates existence. If this criticism is invalidated, Anselm has a much stronger argument. However, regardless of the logical integrity of the argument, whether or not any faculty can invoke faith in God is a very important question.
A major problem is at hand when considering the ontological argument that it has faith-independent force. Malcolm observes that it is scarcely to be hoped that a demonstrative argument can be produced in good faith. 12. It seems that this living faith is required in order that it may have some motive power. The consequence is that a religious person does not reach any religious image of the world or religion, by virtue of the ontological argument. I do not remember that I ever met Anselm who was converted. I can think, however, that he who recognizes the force of the argument, does not accept his conclusions.
At this point it would be relevant to consider what is meant by “living faith”. The idea, for Malcolm, is connected with Wittgenstein’s characterization of the form of religious life. A religious person is a citizen in a certain community of ideas.[14] These ideas, more correctly called beliefs, shape the way in which a person lives. A religious person has a certain concept of the world and reality. He believes that the world was created, that this author is the lawgiver as well as the giver of life. He may hold certain beliefs about sin and atonement. All these beliefs contribute to a certain picture of the world. A religious person lives in this image of the world, which at its root requires faith. I believe this is what Malcolm (and Wittgenstein) meant when they talked about the religious form of life and life . living faith
A religious person will object to this, contending that the ontological argument is of great importance to religious people. I will not argue at this point. In fact, I believe it is valid in the ontological argument for one who already possesses “living faith.” I believe, together with Malcolm, that this argument is not sufficient for religion. Malcolm distinguishes religious faith in Kierkegaardian light as a derivative or inclination of the passions. In this understanding it can be conceived that a religious person can understand an ontological argument; it is not at all that force which moves her to religion. This movement arises from the emotions. It originates from the spiritual, and thus cannot be replicated by an appeal to reason. Asserting that an ontological argument has no driving force does not mean that it is not important or relevant to a religious person. It simply means not to approach it in a religious way.
Another observation that can be made in the defense of the ontological argument is that it is a means by which a religious person can defend his faith against the attacks of contradictory or irrational religions. At the very least, it provides an ontological argument for the religious person to defend their beliefs from being defined entirely without reason. Many atheists challenge the idea of religion on the assumption that it does not conform to reason. This is not an attack that can be refuted solely on the basis of an ontological argument, especially considering that it is not motivated by religious belief in the first place. Nevertheless, it provides material by which a religious person can justify his beliefs to someone who does not accept their scope. I myself will not condone this defense of religious belief, as the theoretical project that I, together with Malcolm and D.Z. Philip, refuse. But I can imagine that someone who rejects the Wittgensteinian notion of theorizing does not resolve the confusions, so that he would be more sympathetic to the ontological argument by using it in this way.
Indeed, the atheist can take more from the ontological argument than Malcolm allows. Of course, it is very unlikely, probably even impossible, that an atheist would experience any religious excitement because of Anselm’s reasoning. But the argument provides a kind of window into the religious worldview. A religious person sees the world as a gift from God. God has a real part in creating the world, which means that he does not exist only in the mind or intellect of a religious person. The ontological argument provides at least some lens through which an atheist can understand how a religious person sees the world. The argument may not be the way in which religion approaches, but the way in which an atheist might approach religious beliefs.
Malcolm states, “It is inconceivable that the recognition of Anselm’s demonstration, as it is worth, should produce a conversion.” [16] I believe this to be true. A religious person does not reach to believe in God by reason or by any reason, however elaborate or perfect. Religious faith in God is a kind of passion. Although Anselm’s argument is valid, as long as the second variation of “necessary existence as perfection” is taken for “being as perfection”, it leaves something to be desired.
On a final note, I believe that Malcolm sees great value in the ontological argument, its ability to illuminate some conceptual confusion about what it means to believe in God. He says as much in the conclusion of his work, but, I think, a little more can be said. D.Z. Phillips, another famous Wittgensteinian, has argued for what he characterizes as a mistaken view of religion as a theoretical enterprise.[17] The attempt to establish a rational foundation is an approach that Wittgenstein, Phillips, and Malcolm all reject. This idea is connected with the idea that the project of philosophy is one of elucidation of reason, rather than of speculation or exposition. In this knowledge of the philosophers, the duty of the philosopher is to develop grammatical and logical ignorance; to clear the air
The ontological argument can then be observed for its ability to illustrate some refutation of God’s grammar. As Phillips and Malcolm both elaborate, the philosopher “unties the knots” of religion. Many philosophers completely reject this understanding of the philosophers. I will not offer a judgment on whether this position provides a correct understanding of the role of philosophy. However, I find this to be the case when examining Malcolm’s approach to the ontological argument. Whether he accepts this very notion of philosophy or not, I have no doubt that the ontological argument lacks all inspiration. And so he could never move anyone to believe that God would believe by himself. He needed much other inspiration for his religious awakening.
[1] ANSELMUS 61 [2] ANSELMUS 62 [3] Anselm 62 [4] The word God can and is often connected with certain characteristics (perfect goodness, benevolence, etc.). It may be said that the greatest intelligible being is necessarily perfectly good or benevolent. But it can also be argued in another way; it can be argued that it can be greatest with properties and not passions. Either way, I don’t see how it is inconsistently clear that GCB is synonymous with God. [5] Anselmus 62 [6] Anselm 612-613. [7] Anselmus 62 [8] Malcolm 66 [9] Kant. [10] Kant. [11] Malcolm 69 [12] Malcolm 622 [13] Malcolm 622 [14] This edition was drawn from Wittgenstein. [15] Malcolm 622 [16] Malcolm 622 [17] Philip 118 [18] Philip 118
Works cited:
- Malcolm, Norman. “Anselm’s Ontological Arguments.” Metaphysics: The Greatest Questions. Ed.
Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman. Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
1998. Chapter 53.
- Philippi, D.Z. Faiths, Changes and Forms of Life. Atlantic Mountains. Humanities Press
International, Inc.
-
Saint Anselm “The ontological argument.” Metaphysics: The Greatest Questions. Ed.
Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman. Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
1998. Chapter 51.
