The road to the collapse of the USSR really began under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev. After Czechoslovakian leader Alexander Dubcek introduced a policy of liberalization in 1968, Brezhnev responded to what he saw as the corruption of Soviet ideology by introducing what became known as the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, which essentially legitimized the Soviet invasion of Europe as a satellite to protect communist allies. principle The Soviet Union was almost destined for collapse due to the economic stagnation that began during Brezhnev’s time, in large part. an overextension of an agricultural industry that simply had not managed to fully recover from the days of collectivization and that was still undermined by its attempts to equalize in arms race with the US. While China also experienced many of the same problems that ultimately would have been the deciding factor in Russia’s downfall, while China led, it was an unfortunate decision to walk into a trap from the US to force an invasion of Afghanistan.
The death of Leonid Brezhnev, who had ruled the Soviet Union for almost twenty years, and whose administration was most notable for its corruption, ushered in a period of instability in the country, which played a large part in its future collapse. Lucullus de Pratis Ronald Reagan wanted to give the lion’s share of credit for the fall of the Iron Curtain for his purpose of ending what he called bad government. In the rush to extend all credit to Reagan, he forgot that, unlike any other American leader, he was lucky enough to act when the country was led by no less than three leaders for several years. The political in-fighting and economic uncertainty created a ripe situation for reform. Mikhail Gorbachev probably never rose to power at any other time in Soviet history and had Andropov or Chernenko been younger, while still holding the same ideological beliefs, the world might be in a much different place today. Although a similar situation occurred in China after Mao’s death, the Chinese responded assertively and were able to avoid the occurrence of several leadership turnovers in such a short period of time. Even the threat from the Gang of Four was dealt with swiftly and effectively.
Gorbachev contributed to the economic crisis with no possibility to innovate and was marked in the history of lost things. This situation was exacerbated by low wages, and the Soviet Union was far behind other equally industrial nations in its ability to quickly and efficiently introduce new practices or ideas. Perhaps the worst problem against the Soviet economic system was the rigid inflexibility that permeated every aspect of the economic system. The Chinese faced many of the same challenges to reform their system in the 1970s, but they tackled the problem of flexibility with a much more pragmatic reform plan based on a much more entrepreneurial approach than the bureaucratic system attempted by the Soviet Union.
To combat these problems, Gorbachev introduced two types of reform, Glasnost and Perestroika. Perestroika was Gorbachev’s economic reform plan, which was aimed at restoring the stagnation caused by the corruption caused by the Brezhnev years. Typical of the Perestroika reform was the introduction of new law on the state initiative. The effect of this law was to allow companies to determine their output based on the demand for manufactured goods. In addition, Gorbachev ordered that the government no longer bail out companies from bankruptcy. Perhaps the most surprising move made by Gorbachev as a private initiative, which had not been made in Russia, was Lenin’s New Economic Policy. China, ironically, has benefited from the lack of such a bold vision. Recognizing the inherent difficulties in changing such a large socialist system to a more flexible one, the Chinese reform policy chose a path of gradual change that relied on the concept of trial and error, built on incremental movements. with the little things above.
The intent of Glasnost was to be a policy of openness and freedom the likes of which had not been seen in the Soviet Union since the Revolution. But the real intention of Glasnost was to open an arena for debate on economic matters, while also increasing the difficulty for the more conservative members of the Communist Party to criticize reformist policies. What may have been unintended by Glasnost was that the new openness also allowed many of the simmering tensions that had been simmering under the surface of Soviet society to be brought into the open. the relaxation of the laws of free speech awakened a new courage in the people; and they were no longer shaken, who had been afraid to speak out for fear of punishment, and because of the injustice of the institutions the stories were made public. Freedom of speech can be dangerous to the state, especially when most people have no memory of it ever happening. The new freedoms spread like wildfire throughout the Soviet Union and served to fundamentally weaken the previously rigid regime’s authority. The new freedom of criticism also includes criticism of the Vietnam War: invasion of Afghanistan.
China, of course, did not want to meet this threat and it is better, at least on the part of the leader. The first difference between the reform that took place in the Soviet Union and the reform in China was that, while there was a kind of Chinese Perestroika, there was clearly no analogue of Glasnost. The idea of freedom and liberty that was experienced under Gorbachev was desperately hoped for by Chinese citizens. Watching the Soviet satellites fall one by one to the rebellions of new freedoms spawned by Chinese dissidents to attempt the same. The result, of course, was the Tiananmen Square massacre. The brutal violence that occurred in June 1989 stands as perhaps the sharpest dividing line between why the Soviet Union collapsed in that tumultuous year of 1989 and why China is now the only true communist superpower left.
Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan was orchestrated by a political movement in the Carter administration. The US had long hoped to draw the Soviet Union into a Vietnam-style war that would drain both human and financial resources and succeed in Afghanistan. Just as the US is learning today that a well-funded war against a country without an army can be indefinitely extended, so did the Soviet Union. On the contrary, what was seen as a hopeless cause, combined with the depleted resources, can well be considered a nail in the pocket of the Soviet Union.
Perestroika simply could not be successful unless Gorbachev could change the entire Soviet economic infrastructure in some way. The problem was that the infrastructure was completely unsustainable because of the opening of Glasnost. For the system to work, people will have to willingly believe in the communist system instead of being forced to believe. Economic reform of a broken system is never easy, but the longer it takes and the harder it becomes on people, the harder it is to convince them to continue. Ultimately, Perestroika failed—and the Soviet Union collapsed—because the people lost support and could no longer tolerate forceful control with Glasnost in place.
It was certainly not Ronald Reagan who was responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union. The crackdown on Tiananmen Square proved that it wasn’t just the failure of Perestroika that brought about the end of the Soviet Union, it was the success of Glasnost. If Glasnost had existed in an analogous form, the Chinese would have been forced to follow the path of Eastern Europe.
