The National Security Council Report, NCS 68, which was written in 1950, is a widely regarded model that informed United States foreign policy from its inception, from the beginning of the Korean War to the end of the Cold War. But was his final “offensive” approach intended to deter the Soviet Union from future expansion and/or the necessary means of aggression to end it? The phrase “in the eye of the beholder” should answer the question most accurately. Depending on the angle or perspective the document is considered – there are many different opinions on its effectiveness or necessity.
The NSC was created to assist the President on matters of defense and foreign policy. The draft of NSC 68 was criticized by several national and international situations that seemed to snowball. The Soviet Union had already tested its nuclear weapons. The article “The Long Telegram”, or “X”, published by George Kennan, could not be taken lightly. This telegraph made the Americans aware of the potential dangers the Soviet Union would begin to present – “… to weaken the powers and influence of the Western powers … The major Western powers are set against each other… will be negative and destructive in nature… (p. 5). This is what Kennan called a policy of containment, but not a military sense. Also “damage” to China and McCarthyism There were preludes to the rapture of the nation even in the drafting of NSC 68. But once NSC 68 was completed, it was literally put in the “dark” until the outbreak of war in Korea. president-truman”>President Truman knew about the invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans” Truman looked again at NSC 68 and on September. , 1950 ordered that the proposal of the plan be followed in the next four or five years and … that the program be implemented … as quickly as possible” (p. 14).
As soon as the plan went into effect, defense spending immediately tripled. This trend, of increasing military spending, has continued from this point for more than 40 years. But, if you look at the big picture – this military build-up and the arms race with the Soviet Union avoided what was happening – there was no Soviet world domination nor were there nuclear attacks by the Soviet Union. This is not to say that there are not serious or consequential defects within NSC 68.
As stated, the opinion of the document in its own sense is the only true representation of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of NCS 68. These are the conclusions of different factions of the world community about the good, the bad and the uncertainties involved. in the copying of sentences ncs 68;
The thoughts expressed by Paul Hammond tend to criticize NSC 68, but it is “… a plan of certain wisdom and fundamental correctness of containment” (p. 131). Hammond has many problems with the document beginning with the non-existence of any information on “outlining the roles and missions or the uses and limitations of strategic air power” (p. 131). Hammond also described NSC 68 as a “frightening” document that was merely a draft of plans without any concrete facts about the tactics and forces to be used. He also sees the NCS 68 as a replacement for “overturning objectives in war” (p. 132). This error occurred when NCS 68 issued false instructions to the United States government for a use/performance that it should not have obtained.
William Appleman Williams provides a detailed revisionist view of NCS 68. The revisionist principle is generally used to formulate a vision of NSC 68 as a tool for America “… an open door of government that could be reached” (p.132). Williams saw the document not as a tool the United States government used to correct the evils of communism; but rather the country which dishonored “… its noble interest.”
