The concept of desertion is well understood outside of legal circles. The common use of the term implies an understanding for outsiders, and even once the true meaning of the term can be confusingly involved, and sometimes inherently contradictory, the category of judicial philosophy.
According to Gary Martin of Phrases.org, the phrase ‘just desert’ comes from the 16th century. A clearer, modernized version of ‘what he deserved’. In this sense, it is not far from being a popular interpretation. many think that it is said of a second meal, rather than of a treatise, and therefore it is said of a just reward for a good work.
In reality, the word is valid for both good and bad deeds, but from the perspective of criminal justice discipline , is most often applied to negative behaviors. However, it is rarely the duty of the courts to reward those who have committed honorable. noble deeds
According to Thielmann & Wenzel, Just desert is a philosophy of justice in which the criminal is considered as the submission of the victim or the community of status or power relative to the criminal, which requires the expulsion of the offender to correct the moral balance (Thielmann & Wenzel, 2006).
Nevertheless, according to Prof. Nuyen of the University of Queensland, Australia, just means to ensure isolation, so that the punishment fits the crime and is proportionate. Thus he says: “He who has stolen bread does not deserve a prison sentence” (Nuyen, 1997).
But given the confusion about the matter, it seems that there is a greater argument in the matter exactly than the name signifies. If one considers just loneliness for the relief of grievances by mutual rejection, it should not be difficult to censure and remove such a theory from the field of justice. However, if one understands that criminals deserve absolutely what they deserve, no more, no less, it is difficult to find an obvious argument against it.
The concept of distributive justice has long plagued various interpretations of the word equity, and it seems that this word, which refuses to conform to a universalized definition, also stands in the way of this problem. How can he balance what is just for the accused, from the very nature of the specific crime, while preserving any semblance of fairness towards him as a human being? Furthermore, how can each act merit a single sentence, the essence of judicial consistency, ignoring other actions and circumstances that apply to the participants in the defined case?
All manner of extraneous issues have been brought into the mix where justice is concerned. Experts in the field seem unable to distinguish and delineate specific areas of focus, and therefore try to tackle everything at once in one subject. For example, many authorities have pointed to the work of Andreas Von Hirsch, Doing Justice, for a clear picture of what just loneliness means. However, even in summary, even Von Hirsch seems to be a futile clarity of incoherence in the gurgling fog of the vortex. Von Hirsch, in the middle of telling the case of causal relationships in the practice of justice, Von Hirsch introduces the notions of moral obligation among the distributors of justice. Paraphrasing, he says, is not the cause of pain, and punishment causes pain, which has nothing to do with the idea of crime and punishment in the cause of the relationship.
If even Von Hirsch, who is known for his clarity, cannot adhere to a single matter or method of thinking about the moral philosophy of justice, there seems to be no reason for reasoning in any matter. a boundary, let alone one so ill-defined, where there are as many meanings as there are experts, and as many of them are contradictory as just deserts. It can be considered whether justice is considered objectively, where the punishment of crimes can be seen as a causal relationship, or whether justice deals with each case as a single event, taking into account the characteristics and circumstances of all the players, always keeping in mind the excellence of morality.
However, without any such transparency in this area, such discussion is effectively impossible. Therefore, sans definition of consensus, and without the ability to maintain such a discussion on any specific topic, no argument can be had for or against this concept.
Thus, I think, that just solitude is a necessary part of justice, if and when the idea of punishment is represented, that which is the result of the offense committed. Unless the distributor of justice, the president, was a party to the judgment of the crime, the proper moral causes are left out of the matter.
Notes:
Martin, G. Just deserts. Retrieved March 8, 2008, from http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/just-deserts.html
Nuyen, A. (1997). Just deserted. Retrieved March 8, 2008, from http://www.springerlink.com/content/p80225m258v408gp/
Thielmann, I., Wenzel, M. (2006). Why do we punish in the name of justice: Just deserts versus value restoration and the role of social identity. Retrieved March 8, 2008, from http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/sore/2006/00000019/00000004/00000028
Von Hirsch, A. (1976). Doing justice. New York: Hill and Wang.
