Border security has come to the forefront of political wrangling in the United States since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. While this has been an important and very sensitive issue over the past few decades, the attacks signaled a new era in homeland security. Most notably, this interest stems from the fact that the attacks were carried out by individuals who were already in this country. Questions have arisen as to how these individuals managed to get into this country and carry out their attacks without any real hindrances. The central conclusion that most people have come to is that this was the result of failed border security.
The border that separates the United States from Mexico seems to be the most visible evidence of the weakness of the border security infrastructure. Those who live along this 2,000 mile border know this better than anyone. Every day, stories are heard about Mexican nationals who illegally cross this border in search of a better life here in the United States. The very fact that people are able to cross this border and on occasion be successful has raised questions as to whether security along this border is effective.
One aspect of this issue that has been a constant source of controversy is the issue of border militarization. The United States Border Patrol is the agency currently assigned the responsibility of securing the Mexican border. The United States military has, however, been assisting the Border Patrol in specific tasks relating to this endeavor, including interception of drug smugglers. Despite the best efforts of both these organizations, their inherent flaws make them currently incapable of adequately securing our borders and make it clear that a new and more stable agency must take their place in these duties.
There is much controversy surrounding the involvement of the U.S. military in assisting the Border Patrol in border security operations. This is due in particular to one high profile incident in which an individual was killed during routine border security operations. It is because of this incident that the U.S. military should have no part in border security operations.
The past two decades have seen the military become involved in drug enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border as a lead support element, bringing the military into a law enforcement role on home soil for the first time in more than 100 years. Until this time, the military’s role has been limited “by the long standing legal prohibition, the Posse Comitatus statute, which prohibits the military from making arrests, searches, or seizures” (Dunn). This status quo began to change in 1982 after a series of legal challenges opened the eyes of many to the fact that the Border Patrol was severely overwhelmed due to drug trafficking on the Mexican border. It was when this status quo was changed that the door was opened to allow the military to provide logistics such as “military equipment and construction work, to military training and transport, and the use of ground troops to assist police” (Dunn). This has continued in many ways up until recently, when events occurred that changed the belief that the military could handle this new role.
The most notable of these events occurred in 1997 and involved the shooting death of a teenager: “On May 20, 1997, Marine Corporal Clemente Banuelos shot and killed 18-year-old Esequiel Hernandez, Jr., on the edge of the rural, border village of Redford, Texas (near the Big Bend area) during a JTF-6 LP/OP mission looking for drug traffickers along the Rio Grande. Hernandez was completely uninvolved with the drug trade and was only a local eighteen year old high school student known by local residents as a good kid. This was the first time that soldiers on a border region drug enforcement mission shot and killed a U.S. citizen, though it was at least the fourth shooting by soldiers on such missions” (Dunn).
The incident itself yields some particularly interesting facts that show how the military itself is not prepared to deal with internal security issues. One fact of particular note, according to Dunn, is the fact that Hernandez was indeed carrying a rifle. Hernandez did in fact shoot into the area in which the Marine’s were hidden. The interesting thing about these facts is that Hernandez carried the rifle to protect his goat heard from predators. It was later discovered in an official investigation that Hernandez most likely thought he was shooting at some type of predator.
This incident is probably the most highly profiled among the military’s blunders in dealing with border security and served to bring to the public attention the dangers of having armed soldiers responsible for aspect of border security. I can personally speak on this particular matter since I served on several JTF-6 (the inter-agency military group involved) anti-drug missions on the U.S./Mexican border. In several instances, unofficially of course, my squad was given authority to shoot at the ground in front of incoming individuals and vehicles, regardless of whether we came under fire. We were told that this was a necessary preemptive action in some cases. The result of these actions in most cases were very scared illegal immigrants and small time drug runners who were so shaken up by our gunshots that it was nearly impossible to get intelligible information from them.
Another area in which it becomes obvious that the U.S. military should not be involved in border security operations is in relations between the United States and Mexico. The primary way in which this aspect is revealed is in relations particularly between the militaries of both countries. An interesting point is that “Our military-to-military relationship with Mexico can tip in any of many directions” (Demarest). This brings to light an interesting concept, that of the appearance of hostility begetting hostility. Currently, there are no hostilities between U.S. and Mexican militaries. However, if the U.S. military takes an active role in border security, this can send the wrong message to Mexican officials. Giving the U.S. the appearance of being a hostile nation is not in our best interest and will only serve to complicate issues of immigration and smuggling.
The Border Patrol is another serious issue in this discussion over border security issues. The Border Patrol currently operates on both our borders, the 3,500 mile border with Canada, and the 2,000 mile border with Mexico. Each of these borders is distinct from the other in that the climates and the countries on the other side of them are drastically different. This makes it essential that both cases be examined separately in order to give an adequate picture of the whole situation.
One example of failure by the Border patrol and its parent organization, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is the story of Abu Mezer. Mezer was born in the West Bank and given an exit visa to go anywhere that he could in the world. Mezer chose Canada, and after committing several misdemeanors there, was given refugee status. Upon receiving his refugee status, Mezer “headed for a remote mountainous area along the U.S.-Canada border 70 miles east of Vancouver” and crossed into the U.S. illegally. He was caught the first time due to the fact that he suffered hypothermia, and was detained by the National Park Service because there were no Border patrol agents anywhere in the area. After being voluntarily returned to Canada, Mezer made the crossing again, to be caught once again. His next attempt, he made it and was caught, but Canada refused to allow him to return. After this event, the INS’s failure at border security becomes even more readily apparent. Mezer applied for refugee status in the U.S., and on his application clearly stated that Israel had accused him of being a member of the terrorist group Hamas. No one bothered to notice that on his application. This wasn’t the end.
“On the night of July 30, 1997, a legal immigrant from Egypt flagged down two cops on a Brooklyn street. His roommate, he said, was making bombs in their apartment and planning to blow up a subway station. In the wee hours, the cops raided the apartment. In a scuffle, they shot Mezer and another illegal alien, Lafi Khalil, in the legs. A bag in the apartment contained a large suicide-type pipe bomb” (Jeffrey).
This incident gives a scary insight into the serious failure of border security. There are many reasons that this was able to occur, but the prime reason was a lack of staffing by the Border Patrol. The area that Mezer crossed in is called the Blaine sector, and more illegal aliens are apprehended in that area of the Canadian border than anywhere else. The problem is that the region stretches for 102 miles and is only staffed by 19 agents and 4 supervisors. To make matters even worse, the entire sector is unguarded from midnight to 8:00 a.m.
The other area in which Border Patrol and border security are of concern is on the U.S.-Mexico border. The problem on the Mexican border is an overwhelming amount of immigrants, and a faulty policy to attempt to control it. Beginning in 1990, the Border Patrol began a new policy in which they clamped down on urban areas along the border. They spent $8 billion building concrete fences and surveillance systems in and around urban areas. “The assumption was that crossing through the desert was so risky that few would try it. But that assumption was wrong” (Fang). The result of this policy is simply hundreds of thousands of immigrants attempting to cross in dangerous areas such as the Arizona desert, resulting in hundreds of deaths each year. The policy of controlling urban areas has concentrated most of the agents in these areas, leaving desert regions with the highest influx of immigrants to be sporadically and inadequately patrolled. This policy of forcing immigration in to the desert has been called by many “the clearest…and most systematic violation of human rights occurring on U.S. soil today” (Fang). The obvious failures of the Border Patrol and military to provide adequate security along the borders that the United States shares with its neighbors leave open the idea of establishing a completely new agency for this purpose. Any new agency would have to take into account the failures of its predecessors and strengthen those operational areas. This organization would best be served by having both military as well as police training and could function to prevent illegal immigration, stem the flow of drugs into the country, and find and detain those who make it successfully across the border. The obvious federal department under which this organization would fall is the Department of Homeland Security. While this organization would not be a branch of the military, it would retain defensive training, reconnaissance training, as well as light weapons training. It would have to be operational everywhere, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and be highly mobile. It would not, however, be aggressive in nature. It would be purely defensive and enforcement oriented.
This idea of establishing a new Federal agency for the purpose of border security is not a new one, and will probably receive more credence as the war on terror continues to wage and more holes in the current security system are exposed. The Border patrol and the U.S. military are the two most prominent examples of these holes. The military’s policy is that of aggression. The Border Patrol’s policy is that of securing the cities, but leaving uninhabited areas open and understaffed. This status quo cannot be maintained if we as a nation are to be more secure in a world of constant threat.
Sources
Demarest, Geoffrey B. “Border Patrol Enforcement Versus Militarization.” Military Review. 77.3:91-93. EBSCOhost February 2004 http://web13.epnet.com
Dunn, Timothy. “Military Collaboration with the Border Patrol in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region: Inter-Organizational Relations and Human Rights Implications.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology. 27.2:257-279. EBSCOhost February 2004 http://web13.epnet.com
Fang, Bay. “Between Two Lands.” U.S. News and World Report. 135.3:18-24. EBSCOhost February 2004 http://web13.epnet.com
Jeffrey, Terence P. “The INS Catch-and-Release program.” Human Events. 57.46:7. EBSCOhost February 2004 http://web13.epnet.com
