Abstract
When concentrating profoundly on Northern Ireland and a historical period known to the Irish simply as “the Troubles,” one cannot overlook the 1981 hunger strikes of the Republican prisoners at Long Kesh. Initiated by members of the IRA, the protest achieved international media attention in addition to increased levels of sympathy on behalf of the general public. Moreover, the Ulster Conflict has genuinely stood the test of time. Even at the present, across the island of Ireland, there exist multitudes of memorials to the most prominent figures of the Irish Republican Army, and most predominantly Bobby Sands and the other H Block prisoners who refused to be labeled as a criminal for participating in acts which can only be categorized within the realm of domestic terrorism.
One can easily become enraptured by the obvious sacrifices made by the hunger strikers of 1981, and undoubtedly, the Irish Republican movement has been romanticized. Individuals who can only be classified as terrorists, as being glorified, going down in history as martyrs for the Republican cause. This operation, however, has been carried out in part by the media and by regimes in disagreement with the administration of then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
The Irish Hunger Strikers of 1981
As discussed by Robert Perry in his article, “Revising Irish History: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the War of Ideas,” in Irish scholarship, there are three categorical viewpoints that stand out on the spectrum of Irish Nationalism. First, exists the Anti-Nationalist approach where individuals question the feelings that the British are merely working to oppress the Irish and to reinforce their dominance over others. The Traditional Nationalist approach, on the other hand, represents a interest to deny the existence of British Imperialism in the past and to attempt to rehabilitate the role of Great Britain in Irish history and political affairs. Lastly, there is a third viewpoint which serves as a merging of the two aforementioned presumptions. This approach is by far, the most empirical of the three, and for scholarly purposes, this mindset it the most crucial as it maintains more realistic, flexible, and self-critical qualities (Perry 330).
Furthermore, through political attempts to resolve the Ulster Conflict, the third approach has been the most employed. In fact, in his article “The Fenian Ideal and Irish Nationalism,” Alvin Jackson noted that in the context of the Troubles after 1969, British and Irish official strategies focused upon bolstering constitutional Nationalism in Northern Ireland as well as brokering a deal between the lawful parties of both Unionists and Nationalists (Jackson 308).
Such strategies, however, were not enough to ease the discontent of Irish Republicans. Based upon a strong sense of democratic separatism, Republicans involved in the Ulster Conflict felt and continue to feel an inherent sense of Fenianism. Throughout the island of Ireland, there remains a strong notion of the desire for Home Rule, and in the eyes of Republicans, Great Britain is simply asserting an unfounded sense of imperialism over the Northern Irish (Jackson 312). As a means of attempting to force the British Government from their turf, citizens of Ulster began carrying out acts of blatant hatred, and quickly, Irish Republicanism became associated with the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army, and a very vengeful violence (Jackson 308).
As the proceedings of organizations such as the PIRA and the INLA began to escalate, the media in the Republic developed the tendency to concentrate more on the social and political context of the Troubles by focusing less on the violence in the North than the British media did. Perhaps this came as a result of the fact that the British Government deemed is necessary to maintain a heavy hand in regulation in order to avoid awarding greater strength to Republican efforts.
In fact, on March 1, 1971, the Irish media began operating under the Section 31 Legislative Ban which excluded Republicans from the airwaves. Such a response was introduced in order to refrain from broadcasting “any matter that could be calculated to promote the aims and activities of any organization which engages in, promotes, or encourages advocates the attaining of any particular objective by violent means,” (Rafter 63).
As outlined in his article “Bombers and Mavericks,” Kevin Rafter professes that although the ban did not apply to print media, representatives of the Republican movement were rarely profiled by the press (Rafter 69). Many media sources were simply too fearful of publishing such controversial material, so it was not until 1977, when Magill Magazine was first published in Dublin, that Republican viewpoints truly began to reach a mainstream audience via a media outlet. The Northern Irish conflict was obviously a crucial news story for a current affairs publication, but covering the IRA also provided commercial benefits. Other news outlets held the position of either ignoring Republican remarks entirely or simply marginalizing a major participant in the plot, so on this platform, Magill provided an outlet for the Republican viewpoint (Rafter 69).
From 1977 until 1990, there were several interviews with members of the IRA which now provide a valuable historical record of the evolution of thinking within that paramilitary organization (Rafter 69). Examining the situation with the benefit of hindsight allows for two different takes on this development. On one hand, we were provided with very rare and specific insight to the psychology of a notorious group of domestic terrorists. Simultaneously, however, Republicans were provided with the opportunity to speak about their cause, especially in terms of their feelings and their goals.
Consequently, a great deal of attention was given to the Northern Irish hunger strikes, which were part of a protest campaign that had been underway since 1976 when the British Government introduced its policy of “criminalization” by refusing to recognize that there was any political dimension to the crimes or convictions of those who chose to participate in Republican paramilitary activities. Such prisoners, however, believed that they should be treated differently from people who had committed crimes such as theft or domestic violence (Howard 69).
As discussed by Paul Howard in his article, “The Long Kesh Hunger Strikers: 25 Years Later,” the prisoners made five demands which encompassed five political rights. The men of the H Block wanted the rights not to wear prison-issued uniforms, free association with Republican political prisoners, not to participate in prison work, access to self-organization or education and recreation, and lastly, one weekly visit, letter, and parcel (Howard 69). The strikes which attempted to gain these freedoms were initiated by Bobby Sands on March 1, 1981, the five-year anniversary of the date that the British Government removed special category status for individuals sentenced for crimes related to the Ulster Conflict (Rafter 70).
During this period and as the leading Republican magazine on the island of Ireland, the owners of operators of Magill believed that the H Block prisoners, and most specifically those on hunger strike, deserved unwavering support, regardless of public associations and accusations against the company (Rafter 70). Support, however, came in the form of increased publicity and material which painted a very negative picture of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. She was portrayed as cold-hearted and unwilling to compromise, and quickly, media depictions presented a synecdoche where nondescript, emaciated people were painted in portraits and murals across North Ireland (Robinson 1).
Furthermore, such imagery only progressed when Bobby Sands passed away in the prison hospital at Long Kesh on May 5, 1981 after 66 days of refusing nourishment. Sands was the first of ten hunger strikers to succumb; however, his death proved to be the most epideictic, causing horror and outrage in Republicans in the city of Belfast and in the rest of Northern Ireland (Robinson 1).
As an attractive, twenty-seven-year-old, Catholic husband and father who suffered a tremendous amount of bullying as a youth growing up in a Protestant neighborhood of Belfast, an almost saintly image of Sands began to circulate. Bobby had established himself as the face of the Republican movement, and as a direct result of this scenario, Sands was instantaneously deemed a martyr. A major outcome of the hunger strike period was the politicization of the Republican movement and the reemergence of Sinn Fein into electoral politics and this is a notion was left unforeseen by many (Rafter 71).
Ultimately, the hunger strike was defeated in its political purposes by a resolute British Government. Margaret Thatcher and her administration stood firm against IRA members and H Block prisoners as a means of avoiding a handing over of political victory and enhanced leverage. While Thatcher was tenacious, she was not completely uncompassionate. In fact, she would go on to relax some prison regulations and shorten the sentences of prisoners who obey the rules. Such decision making on behalf of the Thatcher administration displayed flexibility and a genuine willingness to compromise; however, no political weakness was yielded. By doing so, she displayed that terrorist groups cannot always achieve their goals via acts of violence and hatred.
References
Howard, Paul. “The Long Kesh Hunger Strikers: 25 Years Later.” Social Justice: Vol. 33 Issue 4. Pgs 69-91. 2006.
Jackson, Alvin. “The Fenian Ideal and Irish Nationalism.” Victorian Studies: Volume 50, Number 2. Pgs 307-310. Winter 2008.
Perry, Robert. Revising Irish History: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the War of Ideas.” Journal of European Studies: Vol. 40 Issue 4. Pgs 329-354. Dec 2010.
Rafter, Kevin. “Bombers and Mavericks.” Media History: Vol. 17 Issue 1. Pgs 63-77. Feb 2011.
Robinson, Katherine. “Slipping These Earthly Bonds and Stepping into Immortality: Public Mourning, Epideictic Rhetoric, and Martyfication.” Conference Papers — Northeastern Political Science Association. 2008.
